Reference ID 08MEXICO3178
Created 2008-10-27 18:06
Released 2010-12-18 21:09
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO5863
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3178/01 3011811
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271811Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3711
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1442
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MEXICO 003178
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO REBUILDING TIES TO VENEZUELA, SLOWLY
REF: A. MEXICO 000185
¶B. MEXICO 000886
¶C. LIMA 000663
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. President Felipe Calderon has attempted since taking office to repair ties with Venezuela, and the Foreign Ministry has said that Mexico is slowly making improvements. Nevertheless, several points of friction, such as the lack of a Venezuelan ambassador in Mexico City, suspicions about Venezuelan outreach activities in Mexico, and the expropriation by Venezuela of Mexican assets have prevented\ and probably will continue to prevent the relationship from becoming truly warm. On the Bolivarian promotion front, Venezuela is clearly conducting outreach activities in Mexico, but to what appears to be little avail. Mexico does not offer the kind of fertile ground for Bolivarian activism as do some other countries in the hemisphere. A mistrust of foreign interventionism and lessons learned from the 2006 presidential election probably will prevent the Bolivarian movement from impacting significantly the Mexican political or social scene. End Summary.
Mexico Working to Strengthen Ties
---------------------------------
¶2. (C) President Calderon since taking office in 2006 has sought to repair Mexico's tattered relationship with
Venezuela as part of his efforts to position Mexico to take a stronger leadership role in Latin America and conduct "respectful relations" with all nations (ref a). Despite Chavez's initial refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Calderon's victory in the contested 2006 presidential election, the two countries reinstated full bilateral
ties--the Fox administration had revoked the Venezuelan Ambassador's credentials and recalled its own ambassador in Caracas--and Mexico has sought to maintain a cordial tone in the conduct of its affairs with its southern neighbor. The Calderon government responded relatively quietly even to Chavez's contentious decision to nationalize Mexican cement giant Cemex's Venezuela-based assets, expressing concern and
promising to protect Mexican interests abroad, but without taking any retaliatory measures. The Foreign Ministry's (SRE) Director for South America, Rafael Bernal Cuevas, told Poloff on October 23 that Mexico's relations with Venezuela have not recovered their pre-Chavez cordiality, but that they are slowly moving in that direction. In her September testimony before congress, Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa also outlined steps Mexico had taken and continues to take to improve relations with Venezuela.
A Few Bumps in the Road
-----------------------
¶3. (C) Despite the improvement in bilateral relations since the Fox administration, Bernal outlined several points of friction. He noted that Venezuela still had yet to replace former Venezuelan Ambassador to Mexico Roy Chaderton after he was named Venezuela's Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States in April. Bernal said the extended absence of an ambassador made the conduct of bilateral relations in Mexico City "uncomfortable." He also said that Mexico is not heavily involved in the Cemex negotiations at Cemex's request, but is carefully monitoring the progress of the talks.
¶4. (C) Like Venezuela, Mexico is also looking to assert its leadership in the region, particularly in Central America. Bosco Marti, the Director of SRE's Plan Puebla Panama Office, complained to Poloff that Mexico could not compete with Venezuela when it came to the kind of money it was tossing at member countries through its ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas) initiative.
¶5. (S/NF) In response to Poloff's question about press reports that Mexico would look to put an end to Miracle Mission flights into the country, Bernal said that Mexico was trying to regulate the program and codify it in official bilateral channels, rather than allowing it to be negotiated
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and executed at the local level. One article had reported that the Foreign Ministry wanted flights to be registered as commercial airline and pass through appropriate security measures upon landing in Mexico rather than entering with "extraordinary permits," as had been occurring. Bernal made discreet reference to Mexican concern about the ideological component to the program, and said that at the very least, Mexican patients were returning to Mexico with the message that the Venezuelan government provided a service to them their own government could or would not. Sensitive collateral reporting suggests that the GOM as of September was concerned that Miracle Mission patients received pro-Venezuelan and anti-US briefings as part of their stay in Venezuela. The GOM was reportedly worried that such patients returned to Mexico more sympathetic to pro-Chavez themes and were more likely to participate in associated marches or rallies. Bernal mentioned the presence of Bolivarian groups in Mexico, but noted that such groups exist throughout the
world and that, as a democracy, Mexico had to offer them freedom of expression.
Venezuela Looking to Spread the Revolution
------------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Mexico City daily El Universal reported in October 2007 on a purported Venezuelan government document laying out a 2007-2013 political and economic development plan which included points on strengthening alternative movements in Mexico to "break away from imperial domination" with the
larger goal of rallying "the masses" worldwide in "support of
the revolutionary process." In line with this strategic
objective, Venezuela is seeking to cultivate support at the
grassroots level in Mexico, primarily through social programs
and low levels of financial and logistical support.
Who Is Involved?
----------------
¶7. (C) Analysts from the Mexican National Intelligence Center (CISEN) told Poloffs on October 2 that they have identified some 500 serious Bolivarian activists--all Mexican citizens--across the country, which are often in contact with each other and tend to be linked to larger social movements. CISEN noted that many Bolivarian sympathizers are tied back to the Red de Solidaridad con Cuba, which has been active for decades but which has appropriated Chavez's rhetoric in order to freshen its own discourse. In addition to the Cuban support networks, a chapter of the region-wide Bolivarian Continental Coordinator operates in Mexico, and other pro-Venezuela activists are linked to the Worker's Party (PT) and different student groups operating out of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). XXXXXXXXXXXX a recent XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed to Poloff that most pro-Venezuelan student groups are run from the political science and philosophy departments, from which hailed Lucia Morett, the Mexican student who survived the bombing of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) leader Raul Reyes' Ecuadorian camp in March. He also noted that in a school with a population over 300,000, political ideologies of every persuasion are bound to be represented.
¶8. (S/NF) Minister Counselor Jaime Acosta and Political Officer Paola Holguin from the Colombian Embassy in Mexico City told Poloff that Venezuela has a considerable presence in Mexico, noting that a number of legislators (who they did not name) openly support Chavez. Sensitive collateral reporting indicates that Venezuelan officials also have regular contact with members of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), specifically Ruth Zavaleta and members of the New Left Faction, the New Alliance Party (PANAL) and the Workers Party (PT).
Who Is (Maybe) Not
------------------
¶9. (S/NF) After Chavez's public endorsement of 2006 presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador did nothing but tarnish the PRD leader's campaign, many Mexican politicians are wary of cozying too much up to the Venezuelan president. CISEN told Poloff that it has no evidence, for
MEXICO 00003178 003 OF 004
example, that Venezuela currently is providing direct funding to Mexican political candidates, nor to they think it is likely in the runup to the 2009 legislative and gubernatorial elections. The analysts believe that most political leaders have learned from 2006 not to risk their candidacy by accepting Chavez's support, either overtly or covertly. Sensitive collateral reporting also indicates that the Venezuelan Embassy has been unsuccessful in building rapport with Lopez Obrador, who has reportedly decided not to
establish a relationship with the GOV so as not to risk his
reputation.
¶10. (C) CISEN is looking for close links between Venezuela and the more radical, violent groups in Mexico. CISEN has yet to uncover concrete links between the Popular Revolutionary Party (EPR) and Venezuela, but continues to investigate given the ideological affinity between them.
What Is Offered
---------------
¶11. (C) As it has throughout the hemisphere, Venezuela seeks to woo Mexicans via social handouts to impoverished groups and modest financial support to its like-minded Mexican cohorts. CISEN reported that the Venezuelan Embassy in Mexico is providing small donations to pro-Bolivarian organizations, mostly for operating expenses such as vehicles and propaganda. CISEN suspects, however, that the Embassy also provides funding for members of these organizations to travel to Bolivarian Congresses of Latin American leftist groups, such as the event Morett attended in Quito prior to leaving for Reyes' camp (ref b).
¶12. (C) Venezuela's ability to implement large-scale or effective social programs in Mexico seems limited, at best. CISEN said that Venezuela has established two medical clinics in northern Mexico, including in Nuevo Leon State, but they have yet to open for business. Moreover, CISEN reported that only a handful of Mexicans have participated in Venezuela's "Miracle Mission," which offers low-cost eye surgery to
Mexicans in Venezuela. El Universal reported on October 20 that some 509 Mexicans have received treatment, which is in sharp contrast, for example, to the tens of thousands of Peruvians who have partaken (ref c) in the program. CISEN opined that, unlike some of their poorer and smaller Latin American neighbors, Mexico offers significantly more social support. The Health Secretary, for example, published figures indicating that between January and July 2008, over 26,000 Mexicans have received eye surgeries through Mexico's own programs. CISEN noted that Cuba also provides a literacy teacher training program in Michoacan, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and
Tabasco and scholarships for Mexican students to study in
Cuba, but that the Venezuelan and Cuban Embassies seem to
operate quite independently on most matters in Mexico.
¶13. (S/NF) Venezuela's efforts are being further circumscribed by resource limitations and GOM trepidation.
Sensitive collateral reporting indicates that as of early October, the Venezuelan Embassy was finding it virtually impossible to undertake pro-Bolivarian activities in Mexico--such as holding events or hosting
delegations--because of lack of funding from the Venezuelan government. The Mexican government is also less than receptive to Venezuela's outreach efforts. The attempt to more strictly regulate the Miracle Mission program in Mexico, for example, probably reflects GOM suspicion as the Venezuela's goals for and conduct of the program.
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) Calderon and the Foreign Ministry still appear committed to strengthening Mexico's ties with Venezuela as part of a strategy to position Mexico in a leadership role in the region and maintain friendly relationships with all itsneighbors. Nevertheless, due to the ideological gap between Calderon and Chavez and several points of minor--but still significant--irritation, relations will probably continue to be less than warm. Chavez's tardiness in appointing a new ambassador to Mexico, for example, certainly has rankled the protocol-obsessed SRE, and has hampered progress on bilateral
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issues in Mexico City.
¶15. (C) Venezuela is conducting outreach activities in Mexico, but to what seems to be little effect. Mexico does not offer the kind of fertile ground to Bolivarian activism as compared with some other countries in the hemisphere. A mistrust of foreign interventionism and lessons learned from the 2006 presidential election probably will prevent the Bolivarian movement from having much influence in the Mexican political or social scene. Post will continue to watch for signs that Venezuela is increasing ties to some of Mexico's more dangerous radical groups, in particular the EPR. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
GARZA
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